Clarity in the murky world of forced entry orders on access injunctions: Stonewater v Harris

For those working in the compliance sphere of social housing, the last few months have been particularly interesting, with a number of reported cases addressing forced entry orders. Unfortunately, none of these decisions are binding, and until recently there has been no clear consensus, with different Judges reaching different conclusions for different reasons.

By way of recap, the first notable decision was Sovereign v Hall, an appeal heard within the County Court. In that case, the Circuit Judge permitted a forced entry provision, accepting that CPR 70.2A(2) gave the Court power to make such an order in order to secure compliance with an injunction.

The position then appeared to shift in Southern Housing v Emmanuel, where District Judge Cridge refused the inclusion of a forced entry clause, concluding that the Court had no jurisdiction to make an order of that nature.

This was followed by Taylor Clark v Mohammed in March 2026. Having considered the judgments in both Hall and Emmanuel, the Court adopted the reasoning in Hall and confirmed that a forced entry provision could be included within an injunction order.

Perhaps the clearest authority now available to social housing providers is the decision in Stonewater v Harris, handed down on 13 July 2026 by His Honour Judge Glen, the Designated Civil Judge for Portsmouth. As the most senior Judge to have considered the issue to date, HHJ Glen undertook a detailed review of the principles and reasoning in the previous three cases before concluding that County Court Judges do, in principle, have the power to make an order permitting landlords to force entry in order to undertake gas and electrical safety inspections.

What makes the judgment particularly valuable is not simply the conclusion reached, but the clarity of the reasoning underpinning it. HHJ Glen considered the earlier authorities alongside CPR 25.1(d) and CPR 70.2A(2), ultimately providing a coherent framework for why such orders can properly be granted. Of particular significance is the Judge's consideration of the alternative remedies available if a forced entry order is not granted. Those alternatives are possession proceedings and committal for contempt. HHJ Glen observed:

"The alternatives to granting the relief sought are both unattractive and disproportionate. Committal for contempt of court is often a complex, lengthy and expensive procedure and ultimately may not by itself necessarily produce the outcome sought. The issue of possession proceedings is truly an example of taking a sledgehammer to crack a nut."

However, the judgment also identifies important limitations on the exercise of this power and proposes a framework for the Court’s consideration. HHJ Glen suggested that:

1. Although it is possible to grant such an order at a first injunction hearing, this will not normally be the appropriate course and the issue is generally better considered on a subsequent application to vary.
2. The Court should be provided with, and consider, information regarding any vulnerabilities within the household.
3. Any order should require at least 48 hours' notice to be given before entry, and landlords should not proceed where a tenant is present and actively opposing entry.
4. As a matter of good practice, the order should include provision for the tenant to be provided with a replacement key, for example through the use of a key safe.

In summary, Stonewater v Harris is a further helpful decision for social housing providers. Whilst it is not binding on District Judges, it currently represents the clearest and most comprehensive judicial analysis of forced entry provisions and provides a practical framework for Courts to follow.

The important point for landlords is that the decision confirms such clauses can, in principle, be granted. However, the safeguards identified by HHJ Glen are likely to be central to any future application, and the judgment suggests that obtaining a forced entry provision at the first hearing may be less likely than securing one on a later application following the grant of an injunction.

After a period of uncertainty, there is finally some welcome clarity in what has been a particularly murky area of law.